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Review by Thomas C. Field Jr., Embry-Riddle College of Security and Intelligence 
  
In this timely study of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) programs in El Salvador between 1979 and 
1991, Brian D’Haeseleer argues that ground-level applications of military civic action are frequently less 
about ‘hearts and minds’ nation-building than they are a means to effectively search and destroy. 
Implicitly exploring the mismatch between COIN’s liberal developmentalist underpinnings and the 
brutality of its real-time implementation, D’Haeseleer’s explicit critique employs the more instrumental, 
policy-friendly language of costs and benefits. Taking stock of the relatively small geographic footprint of 
Washington’s twelve-year, $4 billion COIN effort, D’Haeseleer concludes, “If a massive and 
unsustainable investment of resources by Washington into a very small country was still inadequate to 
accomplish its mission, was it ever achievable?” (505) 
  
From the article’s outset, D’Haeseleer frames his study as a direct challenge to the decades-long 
insistence of Pentagon intellectuals that the U.S. COIN effort in El Salvador was a model of success. 
Citing a host of sanguine articles published in the echo chamber of Defense Department journals such 
as Joint Forces Quarterly, Marine Corps Gazette, Parameters, and Military Review, D’Haeseleer 
counters that billions of COIN dollars in fact resulted in a decidedly non-victorious stalemate followed by 
democratic elections that had long been anathema to Salvadoran elites.[1] More fundamentally, 
D’Haeseleer’s research suggests that the Salvadoran government’s tenuous ability to withstand the 
twelve-year uprising owed to brute force repression and the horrific employment of state terror, not to 
COIN’s liberal developmentalism or its limited appeals to campesino dignity and desires.[2] 
  
The main strength of this article lies in its discussion of the high cost and limited impact of U.S.-funded 
COIN projects in El Salvador. D’Haeseleer finds, for example, that officers in the El Salvadoran Armed 
Forces (ESAF) only “begrudgingly accepted” the developmentalist advice from U.S. COIN experts, and 
that they usually did so merely as a quid pro quo for more advanced materiel with which to “focus on 
pursuing and killing the guerrillas” (508). Salvadoran elites, for their part, tended to oppose any COIN-
driven attempt “to improve economic and health conditions in the campo…and viewed these efforts as 
associated with communism” (502). More telling still, U.S. President Ronald Reagan himself undercut his 
own military officers’ COIN mantra by arguing in the early 1980s, “You do not try to fight a civil war 
and institute reforms at the same time…Get rid of the war. Then go forward with the reforms” (497). 
Reactionary COIN critics notwithstanding, the Pentagon pumped billions into what eventually resulted in 
the largest U.S.-backed nation-building project between the fall of South Vietnam and the 2001 War in 
Afghanistan (495). 
  
Most of D’Haeseleer’s article is spent cataloging how little the Pentagon achieved. He accomplishes this 
by detailing the underwhelming impact of the Salvadoran military’s U.S.-funded National Campaign Plan 
(NCP), a series of “military uplift” programs that brought agrarian reform, mariachi bands, “skimpily 
clad dancers,” and free army haircuts to a pair of strategically located provinces: San Vicente and 
Usulatán (503-504). Modeled after the Pentagon’s Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Support (CORDS) program in South Vietnam, the NCP was based on the late colonial ‘oil spot’ theory of 
pacification and social development. Once consolidated in a key area, the theory went, state control wicks 
naturally outward across colonized social space. For their part, Salvadoran rebel leaders recognized the 
massive cost of these pilot projects, and they encouraged their followers to accept aid programs and 
simply ask for more. By making escalating claims on the imperial center, insurgent populations strained 
local military resources and forced San Salvador to increasingly rely on funding streams from a relatively 
ambivalent U.S. Congress. The reasons for lagging domestic U.S. support for the Pentagon’s COIN effort 
are actually underexplored here, although they are presumably dealt with in D’Haeseleer’s broader body 
of work. As he suggests, Congress had little patience for the war, and civilian U.S. agencies such as 
USAID refused to participate in nation-building projects with a local army force that was deeply 
implicated in rapes and murders of priests, nuns, trade union leaders, and rural populations at large (507). 
  
D’Haeseleer’s decision to evaluate COIN’s success and failure on the Pentagon’s own terms, rather than 
on domestic U.S. moral considerations, thus begs the rather Whiggish question of whether it might have 
worked in El Salvador had it enjoyed a broader basis of support and financing within the United States. 
This minor criticism suggests a related limitation of this case study: it addresses only military civic action 
and not the broader buffet of civilian nation-building programs that have typically accompanied COIN-
style developmentalism elsewhere in the American imperium. Nonetheless, by implicitly breaking down 
the presumed dichotomy between traditional warfare and liberal COIN nation-building, D’Haeseleer’s 
study serves as an important and timely corrective to the evolving scholarly treatment of Washington’s 
long and checkered history of counterinsurgency in the Global South.[3] 
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